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Appiah-Mensah: “Security Is Like Oxygen”

“SECURITY IS LIKE OXYGEN”
A Regional Security Mechanism for West Africa
Lieutenant Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, Ghana Navy

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the geostrategic significance of Africa to the
United States has markedly declined, resulting in the treatment of Africa as a
1
“backwater” in official U.S. policy making in recent years. The derogation of African issues in U.S. foreign relations became evident as early as 1989, when war
broke out in Liberia, a country hitherto regarded as having a long-standing spe2
cial relationship with the United States. But Africa’s, even Liberia’s, low priority
in the dawning era failed to draw U.S. military intervention “to nip the civil war
3
in the bud.” This prompted the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to form and insert an ad hoc military force—the ECOWAS
4
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG—into Liberia in 1990. Initially
designed for a brief operation in Liberia, ECOMOG has since deployed in two
other states as well, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. Given the current chaotic,
even hopeless, situation in Sierra Leone, and the less serious but still nebulous
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Though some outside observers see these regional initiatives as offering opportunities for African countries and their external partners, the new security
arrangement poses many challenges. The West African subregion may not yet
have the political, military, or economic means to accom6
plish the strategic objectives it has set for itself. In fact, this
is a tall order; to imagine that ECOWAS can shoulder the
burden alone would be a strategic miscalculation. If the
security mechanism is to take off at all, let alone have any
real chance of success, external support from the United
States and other Western countries is crucial. Therefore, the
United States and the international community may have to
rethink their policies, reorienting them toward Africa in a way that reflects the
current security dynamics in the region.
This article begins by defining the concept of security within the context of
the volatile African environment. It then offers insight into the framework of the
ECOWAS security architecture, as envisaged by its current leaders. Against the
background of the political, socioeconomic, and military realities in the subregion, the article makes a case for strong external support to help bring about the
desired dividends of the security mechanism.
Any critical analysis of the security paradigm in Africa requires a firm grasp of the
unique African concept of security. For Africans, “emancipation is the freeing of
the people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints
which stop them [from] carrying out what they would freely choose to do. . . .
Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not
7
power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.”
Thus, African security encompasses the whole range of dimensions of a
state’s existence, including some that are already assured in developed countries.
Generally, but especially in some states, such issues as internal disorder, the
danger of food shortages, human-rights abuses, unequal opportunity, tribal
imbalance in government and military institutions, insufficient social development, economic dislocation, colonial and neocolonial cleavages (mind-sets),
and threats to freedom of speech constitute security problems in Africa.
ECOWAS AND THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Founded in 1975 as a forum for economic promotion and development, social
and cultural matters, and the general progress of the continent, ECOWAS has
emerged from the Liberian civil war as Africa’s foremost economic, political,
and security grouping.8 ECOWAS adopted security-related protocols in 1978
9
and 1981, but none had been implemented at the time of the Liberian conflict.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/5

2

Appiah-Mensah: “Security Is Like Oxygen”
54

Ghana

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Thus, the conflict served as a wake-up call for the community to fashion its own
security agenda. This conflict threatens the stability of the subregion—it has
spilled over to neighboring Sierra Leone, and it poses serious threats of rebel at10
tacks at the borders of Guinea. Guinea-Bissau’s recent political turbulence may
also be linked to the war. It was, then, to contain and manage the current crisis,
and to build a degree of security and confidence in the subregion, that ECOWAS
endorsed a new security mechanism for West Africa.
The security system is to have as its highest decision-making body a Media11
tion and Security Council. The council may convene “as often as necessary” in
the performance of its five primary functions: authorizing political as well as
military interventions; determining mandates and terms of reference for such
interventions; reviewing such determinations periodically; appointing such authorities as the special representative of the executive secretary and the force
commander, upon the executive secretary’s recommendation; and informing
12
the United Nations and Organization of African Unity of its decisions.
The council will operate through three committees. The Committee of Ambassadors will meet regularly and submit reports on regional peace and security
issues to all council members, as well as affected states. Secondly, the Committee of Foreign Ministers, Defense, and
Internal Affairs has the mandate to discuss the general political and security situation quarterly, or more frequently as
necessary, and report to the council’s third committee, the
13
Committee of Heads of State. In a provision characteristic
of African organizations, an appointed Council of Elders
14
would arbitrate, reconcile, and mediate during conflict.
The executive secretary will maintain a database of qualified and competent individuals who can serve on the Council of Elders. The executive secretary individually has been given an especially important role in conflict prevention and
management—even to the point, innovatively, of deploying fact-finding and
mediation missions on his or her own initiative. (The secretary will, however, be
15
required to report any findings to the Mediation and Security Council.)
Another major innovation is a subregional Peace Observation System to provide ECOWAS early warning, and thereby opportunities for early action, to help
16
the organization prevent situations from degenerating into violent crises. The
idea emerged from the caucus of French-speaking African states that opposed
17
and frustrated ECOMOG activities in the early 1990s; apparently there has
been a change of heart and attitude among the francophone states—a cause for
cautious optimism.
At the operational level, it is envisaged that a brigade-sized formation, to be
called the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, as before), would
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be set up as a permanent peacekeeping force. This “bank of rapid reaction
force” (that is, a reserve of rapid-reaction capability) will comprise contingents
from member states—earmarked, trained together, and organized for deploy19
ment at short notice. Of course, to train a force of this size will require a
sizable and reliable logistical capability. As would be expected in an armydominated organization, the organizers seem to have been oblivious to the invaluable role played by naval and air forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to
their future utility. This is a grave omission; naval forces from Nigeria and
Ghana have been organic to ECOMOG since its inception and have proved
20
themselves indispensable.
Patterned to some extent after the Nato security structure, this collectivesecurity mechanism will require enormous amounts of administrative support
(staff and offices), logistics, military resources, and funding, all of which would
be difficult to obtain from Africa. Funding from the international community
will therefore be crucial to this security project. However, to show its commitment, ECOWAS has proposed a community levy to fund its activities: each
member state would be assessed 0.5 percent of the value of its imports from out21
side the subregion. The levy’s main rationale is easing the financial burden that
22
contributing states would face during military operations.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
A prominent Western analyst has argued, “Africa is poorly understood by U.S.
policymakers, [who] completely ignore the continent until some sort of politicomilitary crisis grabs their attention.”23 This encapsulates the nature of the attention that African issues have received from the United States, and from its major
partners as well, in recent years. U.S. engagement in Africa lacks clarity and sense
of purpose. Indeed, ever since the Berlin Wall came down it has been axiomatic
for the United States, its Western allies, and the international community to pursue African policies that merely respond to crises rather than attempt to shape
desirable outcomes.
Consequently, the amount of U.S. assistance to Africa has declined dramatically. From fiscal year 1985 to 1994, military assistance declined from $279.2
million to $3.8 million, and economic support funding from $452 million to fif24
teen million. For the same period, the total aid flow to Africa declined from
roughly 10.3 percent ($1.87 billion) of an overall foreign-aid budget of $18.13
billion in fiscal 1985 to 7.6 percent ($1.36 billion) of $17.99 billion spent on foreign aid in fiscal 1994. This trend continued through the Clinton administration, which restructured the aid package according to four new general categories:
sustainable development, humanitarian assistance, building democracy, and
promoting peace.
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However, the emphasis placed on democratic and economic development
tends to exclude security factors, which are not only of vital importance to Afri25
cans but critical to their survival in the twenty-first century. As Joseph Nye has
put the point, “Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin
26
to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you think about.” Regrettably, such oxygen is ever in short supply in West Africa. To make even a start
at reversing this trend, ECOWAS, in cooperation with external players, needs to
optimize all the major components of state making. The three main components with respect to security—political, socioeconomic, and military—are so
linked, interdependent, and intertwined that they can be regarded as a “trinity”:
a weakening of one part drags them all down (although the triad is not a
zero-sum game—increasing the importance of one factor does not decrement
that of the others). It is no accident that more than three decades ago, Robert
McNamara (who had just left office as the U.S. secretary of defense) expressed
similar sentiments about security in developing nations: “As development progresses, [and] security progresses[,] . . . [the people’s] resistance to disorder and
27
violence will enormously increase.”
ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES
The essential threats to the viability of third-world states today have been described in a vivid fashion:
The most important . . . are the lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both great
economic and social disparities and major ethnic and regional fissures; lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and governing elite;
easy susceptibility to internal and interstate conflicts; distorted and dependent development, both economically and socially; marginalization, especially in relation to
dominant international security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by
external actors, be they more developed states, international institutions, or
transnational corporations.

28
29

This indeed is the predicament of West African states. Many factors contribute
to this situation, which is characteristic of nearly all the countries in the ECOWAS
group.
The Political Factor: Statecraft in Africa
One set of problems includes the incomplete stage of state making at which
these nations find themselves; another involves the timing of their entry into an
established international system. A third concerns their collective colonial heritage: “Rather than encourage integration, the colonial administrators fostered
fragmented loyalties and ethnic particularism as part of their mechanism for en30
Together, these three kinds of
suring effective control of these colonies.”
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problems have produced African states that are weak, vulnerable, and insecure.
Many ECOWAS members have therefore become candidates for “failed state”
31
status, which has already claimed Sierra Leone and Liberia.
The United States and other international donor countries have for the past
two decades invested in what they perceive as viable West African democratic institutions, but the subregion still remains
32
politically volatile. Nevertheless, in spite of this goodwill, a
contradiction exists in U.S. policy making: “African countries, even if they do adopt political reforms, are unlikely to
receive greater amounts of resources from a shrinking foreign
33
aid budget.” Since recipient nations possess weak economies and no credible military might, the least armed resistance by a disgruntled politician or soldier causes their fragile political
institutions to tumble.
Socioeconomic Considerations
Current statistics on the economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa reveal a
dire situation, one that has the potential to degrade even further. The debt burden remains insurmountable and unsustainable. The region’s external debt in
the 1990s averaged U.S. $204 billion, a per capita external debt of $359 for its es34
timated population of about 628 million (1998). External debt payments,
which for Africa as a whole peaked at thirty-three billion dollars in 1997 (eight
billion more than in 1995) represent more than 17 percent of the continent’s
35
earnings from exports. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi
Annan, observes that “this reflects a catastrophic fall in personal incomes on a
36
scale seen by no other region since the Great Depression of the 1930s.” Perhaps
37
it is time for Africa to have its own Marshall Plan.
Whilst this could be a long-term goal, the short and medium-term economicaid objectives of the United States, other donor states, and international institutions need be synchronized and focused on specific critical areas. To that end,
ECOWAS should be assisted to pursue and sustain collective prosperity through
feasible economic reforms, macroeconomic coordination, and free-market prac38
tices. This would give ECOWAS a fair chance of survival as an economic entity,
with a reasonable prospect of achieving the ambitious security architecture it
has proposed for itself.
Military Power
The current military capabilities of the ECOWAS member states are inadequate
to counter contemporary challenges and threats in the subregion. Even Nigeria,
the subregional power, has struggled to maintain its presence in Liberia/Sierra
Leone. As retired commodore Olutunde Oladimeji of the Nigerian Navy has
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observed, “Nigeria has been operating with inadequate equipment [and] . . .
39
budgets and [under] logistics constraints.” For this reason the new security
mechanism envisages the pooling together of military strengths, in the form of
an ECOMOG standing force that will be trained, equipped, and prepared to intervene in crisis areas. To this end, assistance in the form of equipment, funding,
and training from the United States and other Western allies is critical. It would
also be encouraging to see Nato initiate a dialogue with ECOWAS to share its invaluable experience in institutional arrangements and assist where necessary
with equipment, military accoutrements, and technical cooperation.
Already, cooperative security arrangements exist between certain members of
Nato and some of the ECOWAS states. The United States has initiated an African
Crisis Response Force, training personnel in selected countries so that indige40
nous forces can deploy into crisis areas. Also, in 1996 ECOMOG enjoyed some
41
$30.4 million in assistance from the United States. Britain and France are also
pursuing similar but parallel initiatives in the region. It would be prudent to coordinate and synchronize all these efforts, if their full potentials are to be realized. This is very important, because, as one unofficial but authoritative study of
U.S. government policy states, “unilateral U.S. peacekeeping or peace enforce42
ment operations in Africa are not anticipated.”
WHY SHOULD AMERICA BOTHER?
It has been argued that for the United States, allowing African peace forces to
resolve regional conflicts would be both a “load-decreas[ing]” and a “dollarsaving” opportunity.43 Therefore, investing in an indigenous rapid reaction force
in Africa will reduce significantly the demands upon American forces for intervention in Africa, and therefore, in due course, upon its operating budget.
Moreover, the current U.S. “low-priority,” risk-averse policy on Africa may
ignore longer-term risks to its existing “investment.” During the early 1990s, for
instance, the U.S. failure to intervene in Liberia (where more than 150,000
citizens were slaughtered) did not spare America the loss of facilities worth an
44
estimated four hundred million dollars.
There is also a significant moral and cultural impetus for the United States to
rethink its African policy. It is currently estimated that more than thirty million
members (12 percent) of the population of the United States claim African45
American heritage. These historical and cultural ties should be translated into
viable political, economic, and military relationships in the new millennium. It
will be interesting to watch whether the new American secretary of state, Colin
Powell, allows Africa to be all but ignored in U.S. foreign policy.
Last but not least, Africa has over five hundred million people, as well as
untapped natural resources. It is in the interest of the United States “to support
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and preserve American values of freedom, individual rights, the rule of law,
46
democratic institutions, and the principles of constitutional liberalism” in the
ECOWAS subregion. Regarding military aid, Washington has the “ability to influence African militaries to demobilize or downsize, reform and professionalize
themselves, and engage more effectively in legitimate security and peacekeeping
47
missions.”
In his 1998 report on Africa, the UN Secretary-General restated, in effect, Robert
McNamara’s 1968 observation (quoted above) on the relationships among development, security, and stability: “Peace and development,” Kofi Annan declared, “remain inextricably linked—one feeding on the other, enabling the
other and securing the other.”48 Development has eluded Africans for far too
long, as a result of nearly permanent economic crisis; it is not hard to fathom the
reason why peace has also proven to be elusive.
To address the threats to security in West Africa, ECOWAS envisages a
Nato-type security organization that would have an overarching responsibility
for the security of the subregion. This is an ambitious but important security
mechanism; however, inadequate military resources, fragile political institutions, and weak economies forebode great difficulty in getting started. Increased
assistance from the United States, other nations and international organizations, and private institutions, properly coordinated and synchronized with respect to the desired “end state,” should be pursued in the new millennium. In
West Africa, the three factors of development, stability, and security are so inextricably linked as to defy piecemeal solutions. A holistic and comprehensive approach—one that engages the trinity of security development—is the key to
unlocking the subregion’s security dilemma. In such a way, “the international
community could help not only to support African governments and peoples,
but also rekindle a sense of common purpose and shared humanity essential for
49
planetary survival.”

NOTES

1. See Institute for National Strategic Studies
[INSS], Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington,
D.C.: National Defense Univ., 1995), p. 101.
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Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 188.
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D.C.: National Defense Univ., 1997), p. 164.
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Gambia.
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the United States and the United Nations to
African crises.
6. See Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and
Culpabilities (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), p. 379.
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7. See M. Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1995), p. 10.
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Neither the Defense Council nor Defense
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state earmarked forces for the allied armed
forces of the community.
10. Sierra Leone’s conflict has defied solution,
rendering the country ungovernable. It is
now a failed state.
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12. Berman and Sams, p. 141.
13. The Committee of Foreign Ministers, Defense, and Internal Affairs will comprise
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during the last decade on peacekeeping in
Liberia and Sierra Leone.
23. Peter Schraeder, in INSS, 1997, p. 157.
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Africa in the 1990s has waned, because rapid
democratization of Africa has not stopped intrastate conflict. Neither has the uncoordinated economic aid that trickles into the
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